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This paper aims to address the linkage between logistics (in particular, the management of marketing channel flows) and transport markets,
while also the interaction between these two markets and intermodal container terminals is analysed. The marketing channel theory is used to de-
scribe all relevant actors and flows that run through marketing channels, starting with customer needs and ending with customer satisfaction. Porter’s
theory of competitive advantages is used to review competitive forces in both markets. Finally, a competitor analysis is performed for the logistics and
transport market. These theories are applied so as to be able to determine the competitive position of intermodal container terminals with a view to
the management of marketing channel flows and the physical transport of freight flows. Hence, the central question of this paper is: Which markets
are served by intermodal container terminals and with whom are they competing? At present, neither the maritime container terminals nor the conti-
nental container terminals appear to have a significant influence in the logistics service market; they concentrate mainly on the physical movement of
containers (transshipment). Furthermore, maritime container terminals and continental container terminals are not dominant players in the transport
service market. Our conclusion is that continental terminals are predominantly competing with unimodal road transport, with neighbouring continental
terminals and with barge transport companies.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Prologue
The rapid increase in international container trans-
port has led to substantial bottlenecks in infrastructure
networks. One of the solutions to improve efficiency in
container transport may be combined transport. The
intermodal container terminal that transships the contain-
ers between truck, train, ship and/or barge claims a cen-
tral position in the combined transport chain. This central
position holds especially for the physical movement of
containers (freight flows). The engagement in other flows
(e.g., information) is increasing as well. Much of the cur-
rent research on freight transport is based on a compari-
son between different transport modes and their related
capabilities and (dis)advantages1. The present paper is
concerned with the competitive position of intermodal
container terminals in logistics and transport markets.
Three theoretical perspectives are used in order to review
the position of the intermodal container terminal. Firstly,
the marketing channel theory offers an operational per-
spective on the critical elements of logistics2. Secondly,
the theory about competitive forces3 offers a perspective
on relations between various markets in a marketing chan-
nel. From this perspective, each particular transport mar-
ket is analysed, including the surrounding competitive
forces of suppliers, potential entrants, buyers, substitutes,
and regulations. And finally, this paper offers a competi-
tor analysis as elucidated in particular in the Boston Con-
sulting Group Matrix, which provides a clear view on
competitor analysis in any transport market in a market-
ing channel. In this paper we aim to integrate the three
perspectives described above into a single framework to
analyse the logistics and transport markets in order to be
able to determine the competitive position of the
intermodal container terminal in the combined transport
marketing channel.
1.2 The maritime and continental marketing chan-
nel
All marketing channels start with customer needs
and end with customer satisfaction. Global producers re-
spond to customer needs and this is the start of Figure 1.
Most marketing channel operations start with a maritime
part including continental pre-haulage, deep sea transport
and transshipment, after which the continental part of the
marketing channel operation commences (see both Fig-
ure 1 and 3).
Logistics – the operationalisation of the marketing
channel – is the physical movement of goods from sup-
ply points to final sale points to customers, including the
associated transfer and storage of the goods at various in-
termediate points, accomplished in a way that contributes
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maximally to the explicit goals of the company4. Usually,
several actors join forces in complex channel arrange-
ments. The channel should be viewed as a network that
creates value for end-users by generating form, owner-
ship, place and time utilities5. The marketing channel is
to be perceived as logistics service elements that are made
operational on a vertical axis. The channel flows run be-
tween actors in different markets through which a prod-
uct must move to reach the industrial users or final
consumers (see Figure 2 for an example of two actors).
The logistics elements (flows) in the marketing
channel that are outsourced by producers of goods and
services are depicted in Figure 2. Physical movement then
represents the transport  and transshipment of
containerised freight; storage is the stocking of freight
and warehouse management; information management
concerns all accompanying information that comes with
the physical movement of freight; value added activities
consist of handling that increases the value of the prod-
ucts transported (e.g., assembly); financing is the payment
for the services that are provided; ordering is the man-
agement of the newly ordered products; complaint han-
dling is the handling of a dissatisfied final consumer and
all actions that are necessary to improve that (e.g., a
helpdesk). The marketing channel flows run through the
complete channel from global producer to logistics ser-
vice provider, to global shipping line and global termi-
nal operator. These elements form the maritime part of
the marketing channel (also see Figure 2 for an example
of two actors).
The continental logistics marketing channel contin-
ues with the logistics service provider and is a follow-up
of the maritime marketing channel (see Figure 3). The
logistics service provider that integrates flow elements,
uses transport companies to transport the physical flow
(e.g., containerised freight) to its final destination (cus-
tomer). The services that are mainly outsourced by glo-
bal logistics service providers are depicted in Figure 4.
These services mainly consist of transport and transship-
ment, the necessary information management, some value
added activities, and payment for the services. Added
value tends to be lower in this service portfolio than in
Boxes: actors
Ovals: activities
Fig. 1 Actors and services in a maritime marketing
channel (maritime terminal)
Source: Wiegmans et al., 19996
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Global Producer
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Global Logistics Service Provider
Deep Sea Container Transport Container Transshipment
Global Shipping Line Global Terminal Operator
Fig. 2 Outsourcing of marketing channel flows between
a producer and a global logistics service provider
Source: based on Stern et al., 1996 and Wiegmans et al., 1999
Producer
Global 
Logistics 
Service 
Provider
Physical Movement
Storage
Information Management
Financing
Value-added Activities
Complaints Handling
Ordering
Fig. 3 Actors and services in the continental
logistics chain (continental terminal)
Source: Wiegmans et al., 19996
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the maritime part of the marketing channel due to the in-
volvement in a smaller number of marketing channel
flows (see both Figure 2 and Figure 4).
1.3 Competitive forces in markets and competitor
analysis
Porter’s model of the five competitive forces is a
useful framework when describing any market and its
competitive forces. In this paper we use the model to
analyse the logistics and transport markets in order to de-
termine the competitive position of the intermodal con-
tainer terminal (maritime and continental) in relation to
these markets. Where the marketing channel theory aims
at analysing complete marketing channels (more mar-
kets), Porter’s theory of competitive forces is aimed at
analysing one particular market. The model enables the
analysis of current and future strengths of competitive
forces around a certain market. If markets surrounding
competitive forces are strong, this means that the profit
potential for industry competitors in that market is lower.
In every market, pressure is placed on each company as
a result of competition. Competition is more multi-fac-
eted than just winning strategies of the industry competi-
tors in the current market. Substitutes, buyers, suppliers
and potential entrants also influence a current market. One
additional force is added to our analysis in the form of
the terminal environment. The six competitive forces are
depicted in Figure 5.
Our theoretical framework will be further extended
by using an adjusted Boston Consulting Group Model that
is used to analyse more thoroughly the industry competi-
tors in the logistics and transport markets. Our model is
based on the historical sales volume development and the
market growth rate in a given market. The main busi-
nesses of the companies concerned are taken into account
as well. The positions of the different companies are de-
picted in a matrix. The position in the matrix represents
the market growth rate and relative sales volume of the
company concerned. Our growth-sales matrix consists of
four cells: leaders, nichers, followers, and challengers.
The four types of businesses require different actions
from the corporate level7. Competitor analyses, together
with the other components, forms the basis for identify-
ing the competitive position of intermodal container ter-
minals (see Figure 6 for an overview). After the start with
marketing channel theory to identify the service portfo-
lio of the container terminal, we identify the competitive
forces surrounding the container terminal operator, after
which we analyse the interaction between industry com-
petitors in the right of the figure.
Fig. 4 Outsouring of marketing channel flows
between logistics service provider and
transport companies
Source: based on Stern et al., 1996 and Wiegmans et al., 1999
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Fig. 5  Six competitive forces in any market
Source: Porter, 1980, adapted
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Fig. 6 Theoretical framework to analyse logistics and
transport markets
Source: Stern et al., 1996, and Porter, 1980, adapted
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1.4 Problem definition
The operations and goals of container terminal op-
erators need to be analysed more thoroughly so as to pro-
vide insight in the full potential that is offered by the
combined transport services in which they form an im-
portant part. The aim of the present paper is to provide
insight into the logistics and transport markets and into
the relation between these markets and the intermodal
container terminal. The marketing channel theory is used
to describe all actors and flows that run through market-
ing channels, starting with customer need and ending with
customer satisfaction. Next, Porter’s theory of the competi-
tive forces is used to analyse surrounding competitive forces
of mainly transport markets. Finally, competitor analy-
sis is undertaken in the logistics and transport market.
These theories are applied in order to be able to determine
the competitive position of intermodal container terminals
towards logistics and transport markets. This brings us
to the central question of this paper: Which markets are
served by intermodal container terminals and with whom
are they competing?
For the sake of manageability we will focus on Eu-
rope. The rest of the paper contains the following sec-
tions: Section 2 describes recent developments in the
logistics market in Europe. Section 3 deals with the trans-
port sector in Europe. The final section contains the con-
clusion of this paper.
2. LOGISTICS: INTEGRATORS OF MARKETING
CHANNEL FLOWS
2.1 Introduction
Logistics is the management of all marketing chan-
nel flows, including transport, from customer needs to
customer satisfaction. Logistics encompasses the
containerised product flows from firms to customers
through a network of transportation links, storage, dis-
tribution and handling nodes. So-called fourth party lo-
gistics service providers (4PL’s) are concentrating more
and more on the flows of information management and
financing8,9. Global oriented terminal operators are en-
tering this market as well. Main European terminal op-
erators according to sales volume or container volume are
Hamburger Hafen und Lagerhaus Aktiengesellschaft
(HHLA) from Germany, Eurokai from Germany,
Hessenatie and Noordnatie from Belgium, Ceres Marine
Terminals Inc. from the USA, European Combined Termi-
nals from the Netherlands (partly owned by Hutchison),
P&O Ports from Australia, and Bremer Lagerhaus
Gesellschaft (BLG) from Germany. PSA and Hutchison
ports play an important role in transshipment capacity via
their participation in European terminals.
World-wide costs for freight transport, warehous-
ing and related IT and administration were estimated at
3,425 billion dollars in 199610. Thus, it is no surprise that
physical distribution and logistics play an important role.
Among others, this effect has led to the following gen-
eral strategic developments: (i) managers have realised
that improving the efficiency of individual logistics op-
erations is useless, if the efficiency of the individual func-
tion throws the total system out of balance; (ii) the
logistics system has become an important competitive
tool; (iii) many of the technological developments over
the past 20 years have been system-oriented, which forces
us to consider the logistics system as a whole; (iv) logis-
tics is increasingly perceived as an activity that should
be outsourced; and (v) logistics is no longer a part of busi-
ness where costs are minimised, but is instead seen as an
important strategic activity.
Logistics costs (e.g. transport, handling, inventory)
rise disproportionately as customer service levels are in-
creased. The fact is also that logistic costs often have a
non-proportional relationship with quality levels11. A firm
that supports a service standard of overnight delivery of
95 per cent consistency may, for example, have the double
logistics costs of one of second morning delivery at 90 per
cent consistency. If a transport service lacks consistency,
inventory safety stocks will have to be higher to provide
safety against the possible lack of transport service,
thereby causing higher inventory costs. This suggests that
very seldom the lowest total cost or the highest service
performance will constitute the best logistics solution.
Furthermore, it should be noted that improving individual
logistics components is useless if the total logistics per-
formance worsens. Thus logistics is not considered as part
of business where costs should be minimised, but instead
it is more and more seen as a strategic performance area
where the role of combined transport is increasingly im-
portant. Moreover, logistics is an important competitive
tool and is the area where competition for distribution
control takes place.
2.2 Competitive forces in the logistics market
The first competitive force in Porter’s model in Fig-
ure 5 is the ‘Industry competitors’ in the logistics service
market. There is competition among industry competitors
because actors see chances or feel pressure to improve
their positions. The competition intensity among the in-
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dustry competitors depends on a number of factors:
1. Many (or a number of equal) competitors result in in-
stability in any market;
2.  Slow industry growth results in competition for mar-
ket share;
3.  High investment cost forces industry competitors to
concentrate on capacity;
4.  Lack of switching costs is followed by service and
price competition.
In the logistics service market we see many com-
petitors, high industry growth, relatively low investment
costs, and low switching costs.
In order to provide the logistics services, the mar-
keting channel flow integrator can use his marketing mix:
People, Planet, Profit, Product, Price, Promotion, Place,
and Process (the 8 P’s). People are the most important
element of the marketing mix. In the logistics service pro-
cess the skills of all employees are crucial to produce a
good service. Planet represents the sustainability of the
logistics services. Profits are the result of the production
process and for companies, this is what it is all about. The
product of the logistics service providers can consist of
a lot of different services. The price for the logistics ser-
vice depends on the negotiation skills of both parties, on
the total service portfolio, and on the market power of
both parties. The price is also influenced by the quality
of the delivered logistics service. Promotion of the logis-
tics services especially relies on personal contacts, but
other useful promotion channels exist on the Internet and
via advertising. The logistics service provider should be
comfortably located in order to optimally serve its cus-
tomers (place). Finally, the process that leads to the pro-
duction of the logistics service should be carefully
planned in order to produce the best service possible.
Generally, continental terminals are not offering logistics
services on a large scale, maritime terminals, however,
are increasingly present in the logistics service market.
Buyers of logistics services
The strength of this competitive force depends on
the number of buyers and the relative sales volume the
buyer represents in relation to the logistics service pro-
vider. The buyers will test the profitability of industry
competitors by trying to get lower prices, negotiating for
better quality and greater service, and by negotiating with
more industry competitors simultaneously. The position
of the buyer is especially strong if the seller has high in-
vestment costs and if the importance of a good capacity
utilisation is very high. This is the case in the logistics
service market. Lately, we have seen the development of
more co-operative relationships between shippers and lo-
gistics service providers through the awarding of long-
term contracts.
Suppliers of logistics facilities
The suppliers of logistics service providers are office
and warehouse equipment suppliers and transport suppli-
ers. Suppliers can use their economic power, for example,
by raising prices and lowering the quality of their goods
and/or services. Another option for the supplier is to threaten
to integrate elements of the logistics services into his own
assortment. The strength of this force further depends on
the number of suppliers; if the suppliers of logistics ser-
vices are concentrated, in general they have greater eco-
nomic power. If the threat of substitute products is low,
this will also increase the power of suppliers. If the eco-
nomic prospects of the supplier interfere with the pros-
pects of the logistics service provider, then his attitude will
be more reasonable (in terms of prices for supplies). The
suppliers of office equipment do not have great economic
power towards logistics service providers. The major
threat comes from transport companies that are more and
more integrating logistics into their own service portfo-
lio, which means that the competition in the logistics mar-
ket will further increase.
Potential entrants into the logistics market
Potential entrants to the European logistics market
are new logistics service providers. This fourth competi-
tive force imposes a serious threat to current logistics ser-
vice providers. New logistics companies will increase
capacity as well as competition. Entrants will come from
the USA and Asia. Entry barriers for potential entrants
to the logistics market are not high.
In general, major entry barriers are5:
* Customer loyalty. If the logistics service provider has
loyal customers, it will then be more difficult for a new
company to attract new and existing clients.
* Extension of logistics service assortment. A broader
service assortment will, in principle, create a stronger
company. A strong loyalty between the company and its
customer groups can be created.
* Capital. If major investments are necessary to enter a mar-
ket, this is also a major barrier. This is obviously not the
case in the logistics market.
* Government regulation. Government may impose high
barriers in international transport, for example, by lim-
iting possibilities of cabotage.
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Potential entrants to the logistics market are espe-
cially found among transport companies eager to increase
their service portfolio. At the macro level, potential en-
trants are not to be seen as a threat but instead as a chance
to ensure better efficiency and improved utilisation of
transport networks1.
Substitutes for logistics
Substitutes decrease the potential profits of a sec-
tor by imposing an upper limit on the prices industry com-
petitors in a sector can charge. Each market will have to
deal with options that replace current services or prod-
ucts that industry competitors produce. The most impor-
tant substitute in the integrators service market is formed
by companies (shippers) that perform their own integra-
tion of their marketing channel flows.
Logistics regulations
One influential force in the logistics market that is
not incorporated in Porter’s model of competitive forces
is regulation. The logistics service market is increasingly
competitive and not directly regulated. The transport sup-
pliers of the logistics service providers however, are un-
der various forms of regulation. Another field where
logistics service providers are facing regulation indirectly
concerns environmental issues. Overall, the regulation the
logistics service provider is confronted with, is more in-
directly having an influence via suppliers and buyers.
2.3 Competitor analysis of integrator service provid-
ers
In this section we concentrate on the logistics ser-
vice providers market and analyse the winners and los-
ers according to their historical sales volume and their
current growth rate. Also the activity portfolio is inte-
grated into the analysis. Sales volume and growth rate are
then used to position the competitors in the logistics mar-
ket against each other. The constructed matrix is based
on the Boston Consulting Group Matrix that has been
built to evaluate current businesses of a company. The
Boston Consulting Group Model is based on the market
growth rate and the relative market share compared with
the largest competitor in a certain market. The positions
of the different businesses of a company are depicted in
a matrix, the so-called growth-share matrix. The position
in the matrix represents the market growth rate and rela-
tive market share of the businesses concerned. Our adapted
growth-sales matrix consists also of four cells that are
named: leaders, nichers, followers, and challengers.
Originally, the approach was developed to evalu-
ate businesses of a company. We have applied this approach
to the largest companies in the logistics market. The mar-
ket growth rate indicates the annual growth rate of the
company and is compared with the growth rates of its
competitors and with the average market growth rate. The
relative market share is the sales volume of a company
compared with its next largest competitor’s sales. In the
last years an enormous consolidation wave is taking place
in the European logistics service market12,13. In the two
tables below we depict the two groups of logistics ser-
vice providers: the freight oriented (focus is on, and sales
come from freight) logistics service providers in Table 2
and the container oriented (focus is on, and sales come
from containers) logistics service providers in Table 1.
For the freight-oriented logistics service providers the fo-
cus is on the freight inside the container, while also the
sales of the companies concerned come from freight. For
the container-oriented logistics service providers the fo-
cus is on containers, while the sales come from contain-
ers. In general, the freight is of no interest to them.
Due to lack of data it is not possible to construct
an BCG-matrix for the European logistics service mar-
ket for containers. In Table 2 the main competitors of con-
tainer oriented logistics service providers are presented.
Instead of providing services to container flows, these
businesses provide services to freight flows. This group
of companies provides sufficient data to be able to com-
pare them on profitability, sales, and growth.
Our matrix is based on the 5-year company growth
rate and the 5-year sales volume development compared
with the main competitors. The positions of the different
freight logistics companies are depicted in the matrix above.
Our adjusted growth-sale matrix consists of four cells: lead-
ers, nichers, followers, and challengers. Leaders are big
companies (in terms of sales volume) that are capable of
realising high growth rates at the same time (mainly via ac-
quisitions). This does not necessarily suggest that the prof-
its for these companies are high. Challengers are companies
that manage to realise high growth rates but still have rela-
tively low market shares in terms of sales volume. The com-
panies aim for a few related businesses (focusing), realise
high growth rates and have relatively good profits. Nichers
have low market shares and low growth rates compared
with their competitors in the logistics market. These com-
panies may consider how they could become challengers
or nichers; otherwise the company should look for a merger
or divest. Finally, followers are companies with a relatively
high market share (sales volume), but with a relatively low
growth rate compared with its competitors. The company
should try to increase its growth rate, otherwise the com-
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pany may become a follower. The low growth rate logically
results from problems inherent in integrating new businesses
that stem from the diversification process. The matrix is a
result of the operations of companies and only shows a tem-
porary overview of the positions of the different companies
in the period 1995-1999. We observe that – according to
our definition – TNT is a clear leader and Deutsche Post,
Schenker, and P&O are challengers. Successful challeng-
ers are Hays, Tibett & Britten, and DFDS; the rest contains
nichers. The four types of businesses require different ac-
tions (build, maintain, harvest, or divest) from the corpo-
rate level. In general, most freight-oriented logistics
companies are not involved in the container terminal mar-
ket.
2.4 Conclusions on logistics
Maritime and continental terminals are generally
serving the logistics market of containers. Most terminals
are mainly focusing on transshipment of containers as
their core business. However, especially global maritime
terminals may be expected to further expand their pres-
ence in the logistics service market. Producers increas-
ingly outsource their complete logistics operations to
specialised logistics service companies. This results in an
increasingly important position in marketing channels for
logistics service providers. The competitive power of lo-
gistics service providers towards their suppliers is also
increasing because of the scale enlargement. The logis-
tics service market is a high growth market (double digit)
and competition is rising, which offers interesting oppor-
tunities for leaders, nichers, followers, and challengers.
Scale enlargement is speeding up and the credo is eat or
be eaten. However, an important part of the high growth
in the logistics market stems from acquisitions and not
from a larger market. Furthermore, potential entrants will
enter the logistics market, while also the suppliers will
Table 1  Overview of container oriented European logistics service providers in the market of containers (1995-99)
Company name Sales (million Euro’s) Growth TEU per year Profits Activities
99 98 97 96 95 98-99 (1999) (million Euro’s)
PSA (Singapore) 2,420 1,843 – – – 31.3%– 15,900,000 1,050 International containertransshipment
Hutchison Port 1,485 1,153 – – – 28.8% 17,900,000 591.2 International containerHoldings (HK) transshipment
ABP1 (UK) 510 493 417 360 343 3.5% 921,000 165 Ports, transport,property
HHLG (D) 429 18.9% 2,275,928 12 (X)
Inland terminals,
ECT (NL) 342 332 293 283 296 3.0% 4,700,000 –/– 19 international container
transshipment
General cargo,
CMB (B) 321 305 – – – 5.2% 2,460,000 9.4 container repair,
(Hessenatie) distribution, and
forwarding
Noordnatie (B) – – – – – – 900,000 – Tank storage, fruit
Transport, container
Eurogate (D) 301 – – – – – 6,355,000 20.8 repair, warehousing/
distribution
Maersk Sealand – – – – – – – – Deep sea shipping, oil
and gas, bulk transport
Barcelona (Sp) – – – – – – 1,250,000 –
Ceres (USA) – – – – – – – –
Rail, intermodal,
CSX Corp (USA) 10,296 8,223 8,851 8,780 8,587 25.2% – 132.4 container shipping,
terminals transshipment
Modern Terminals
– – – – – – 2,594,000 –(HK)
Total
1 = Associated British Ports handles more than just containers, the containers are transshipped at Southampton
Source: Annual reports, 1998-1999
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increase their scale through mergers and acquisitions.
Until recently, both maritime container terminals and
continental container terminals did not have significant
influence in the logistics service market. They were con-
centrating on the physical movement of containers (trans-
shipment). Maritime container terminals, however, are
increasingly serving other elements of the marketing
channel than just transshipment. And in this respect, com-
petition with freight-oriented logistics service providers
is heating up. Critical Success Factors for container ter-
minals are then engagement in information management,
big logistics contracts with global producers, and the defi-
nition of the core-business of the terminal and the corre-
sponding organisations.
3. ACTORS ON THE EUROPEAN TRANSPORT
MARKET
3.1 Introduction
Waterways have provided vital transport links for
moving freight for a very long time. Many of today’s
important cities developed around water ports along the
coasts and along rivers in Europe (e.g., Rotterdam,
Duisburg, etc.). Barge transport can be characterised by
regular frequencies, high volumes, low penetration and
low value goods. In general, barge transport is slow,
sometimes the schedules are influenced by severe weather
conditions, and traditionally it is limited to bulk freight
services. But lately we are seeing some interesting and
promising new developments (e.g., faster, bigger, and
Table 2  An overview of the main European freight oriented logistics service providers market (1995－99)
Company name Sales (billion Euro’s) Growth Profit 99 Activities
99 98 97 96 95 98-99 (million Euro’s)
1. Deutsche Post (D) 22.4 14.6 14.1 14.0 14.0 52.5% 864.0 Mail, transport, retail
    (Danzas) (communication and finance)
2. Stinnes Logistics (D) Chemicals, materials,
   
 (Schenker/BTL) 11.8 13.0 10.6 11.0 11.2 –/– 9.2% 164.7 building materials,
wholesaling transport
3. P&O  (UK) 9.2 8.9 8.9 10.6 9.9 3.4% 788.1 Cruises, ferries, transport,transshipment
4. TNT (NL) 8.5 7.4 6.9 6.2 3.1 14.9% 687 Mail, express, transport
5. NFC (UK) 3.8 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.3 8.6% 163.4 Transport, warehousing,
    (Exel Logistics) supply chain services
6. Geodis (Fa) 3.1 2.8 2.7 2.3 – 10.7% 31.8 Overseas, groupage,Full Truck Load, transport
7. Hays Distribution (UK) 2.9 2.3 1.7 1.4 1.2 26.1% 348.5 IT, transport, consultancy
8. Ocean Group plc (UK) 2.7 2.0 1.7 1.7 1.7 35.0% 108.9 Mail, customs brokerage,
    (MSAS Global Logistics) transport, added value
9. Tibbett & Britten (UK) 2.0 1.7 1.3 1.0 0.9 30.8% 48.4 Added value, RDC’s,intermodal
10. DFDS Dan Transport (DK) 2.0 1.3 1.2 1.0 1.0 53.8% 41.0 Transport,passenger transport
Total 68.4 57.5 52.7 52.9 46.3 19% 3,245 ー
Source: Annual Reports, 1995-1999
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cleaner ships) that strengthens the competitive position
of barge transport relative to the other parts of the trans-
port market. Other advantages of barge transport are rela-
tively low costs, a low loss and damage rate (costs), while
infrastructure is abundantly available14. Generally, mari-
time terminals are not offering barge transport in their
service portfolio by themselves; continental terminals,
however, are definitely offering barge transport in their
service portfolio. A number of barge transport companies
originate from continental terminals and most other com-
panies exploit their own continental terminals.
Before World War II, freight transport by rail was
the main transport mode. Over the past fifty years how-
ever, the rail transport sector has steadily decreased in rela-
tive importance. This decline can be attributed to a number
of developments: changing needs of customers, increased
competition by barge transport, and rise of alternative
transport modes with services with a better price/quality
performance. Rail has always been considered as the long
distance (500km and more) mover of bulk freight such
as coal, grain, chemicals, cars, and of low-value manu-
factured goods. However new developments are taking
place: new international actors speed up competition;
containerisation opens new markets for rail transport; and
congestion lowers the competitiveness of road transport.
The potential of rail transport is impeded by nega-
tive economic performances of most companies, differ-
ent voltage systems in the EU, change of personnel at
borders, administrative barriers, technical barriers, long
infrastructure planning procedures, and pre- and end-haul-
age services that are generally insufficient. When one wants
to make rail transport competitive, it should pass from
bureaucratic management to market oriented operation.
A smoother movement of freight trains across national
borders should be encouraged, which could lead to an in-
crease in the average speed of 30-40km/hour (including
waiting time the average speed is 15 to 20km/h). Maritime
terminals and continental terminals are generally not com-
peting in the rail transport market. Terminals do not offer
rail transport services in their own portfolio.
The growth and widespread use of road transport
in the EU is conceivable when one takes a look at the ser-
vice characteristics of the road transport mode15. The road
transport sector has a clear advantage over other sectors
in the field of accessibility. This results in access to al-
most any origin and destination by road transport. A sec-
ond advantage of road transport is speed. For shipments
up to 1,000 km road transport can usually deliver the
goods faster than other transport modes. The smaller car-
rying capacity of trucks is another advantage of road
transport. The benefits are lower inventory levels and in-
ventory carrying costs and more frequent services. The
road transport sector is highly flexible in scheduling
which is another advantage. The road transport sector is
far more customer- and market-oriented, resulting in respon-
siveness to customer equipment and service needs. Fi-
nally, the road transport sector is reliable, relatively cheap,
and has less damages and losses. Less damage results in
lower packaging requirements and thus lower costs. The
road transport sector is far more involved and interested
in the improvement of performance of trucks, roads and
unimodal road transport in general than are other trans-
port modes in the improvement of their transport mode.
Disadvantages of the road transport sector are: rising con-
gestion, rising costs due to the incorporation of external
effects, rising fuel costs, time restrictions on both transport
and (un)loading, environmental regulations, and safety
regulations.
Short sea shipping is defined as all water transport
inside the EU via sea where the origin and destination are
inside the EU. Short sea shipping is an important trans-
port mode on specific origin destination combinations.
Transport between countries such as the UK, Ireland,
Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Greece, and Turkey can be
very suitable for short sea transport. An overview of the
main competitors in the transport market (rail, road, barge,
and short sea) of the EU is given in Table 3.
3.2      Competitive forces in the transport market
In the European transport service market we see
many relatively small competitors originating from EU
countries and high industry growth (see also Table 3).
Most competitors do serve one transport mode including
the logistics component. The largest competitors in the
transport market stem from road transport, rail transport,
and express services. In the European road transport mar-
ket segment almost all competitors operate their own fleet
of trucks in order to be able to deliver express services.
In this market segment we see large global competitors
from the USA and Japan that may be expected to increase
their presence in the European transport market. In the
near future, we may see the emergence of more global
express delivery companies and the disappearance of the
traditional road transport companies into the logistics ser-
vice providers market. In the European rail transport mar-
ket segment we see competitors that are all former
national state monopolies. The three largest rail freight
transport companies come from Germany, the UK, and
France. In the near future, liberalisation will further in-
crease and we may expect more mergers and acquisitions.
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So far, the Deutsche Bahn has taken over NS Cargo and
we have seen the tie-up between the Swiss and Italian rail
freight transport companies. In the table above there are
only a few representatives from the transport modes,
barge and short sea. This is caused both by a lack of data
and the relatively small companies in these sectors.
Buyers of transport services
The strength of the competitive force depends on
the number of buyers and the relative sales volume the
buyer represents to the transport service provider. As there
are just a few express delivery transport companies, their
market power is considerable to buyers. In the road and
rail transport market segments the filling up of the capac-
ity is very important. This reduces the market power of these
transport companies with respect to the buyers of the trans-
port services. As most barge companies are relatively
small companies, this automatically means that buyers do
have considerable power vis-à-vis the barge operators.
The two main groups of buyers of transport are shippers
and logistics service providers. Global producers and glo-
bal logistics service providers purchase transport services
for the continental part of the marketing channel. In gen-
eral, maritime and continental terminals are not acting as
buyers of transport services. However, maritime termi-
nals are sometimes organising pre- and end-haulage,
which means that in such cases the terminal operator is
a buyer of transport services (mainly road and barge).
Table 3  Actors on the European transport service providers market (1995─1999)
Company name Sales (billion Euro’s) Growth Other activities Main transport
99 98 97 96 95 98-99 mode
UPS (USA) 25.8 20.7 18.7 – – 24.6% National and international package Road
FedEx (USA) 16.0 13.2 11.9 – – 21.2% Transportation, logistics, and Road
e-commerce
Nippon Express (JP) Road
Kühne en Nagel (CH) 4.2 4.2 4.0 3.3 3.2 0.0% Worldwide transport and Roadlogistics management
Deutsche Bahn (D) 3.5 3.6 3.6 3.7 – –/– 2.8% Passengers, tourism, stations Rail
Panalpina (CH) 3.5 3.3 – – – 6.1% Airfreight, seafreight, logistics Road
ABX Logistics (B) 2.4 – – – – Road
EWS (UK) 2.1 2.2 2.1 – – –/– 3.6% International rail transport Rail
SNCF (Fr) 1.9 1.9 – – –/–0.1% Passengers Rail
Rail Cargo Austria (AT) 0.93 0.95 0.9 – –/– 1.7% Passengers Road
Christian Salvesen (UK) 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.1 – –/– 10.0% Transport and logistics Road
FS Cargo (It) – 0.75 0.69 – – –/– 4.6% Passengers, regional and Rail
metropolitan transport
SBB Cargo (CH) 0.64 0.62 – – – – Passengers Rail
SJ Cargo Group (S) 0.76 0.70 – – 8.6% Passengers Rail
Gebr. Weiss (A) 0.5 – – – – – Transport, logistics, air- and Road
seacargo, parcel service
NMBS (Be) 0.44 0.45 0.38 – – –/– 2.2% Passengers, logistics Rail
VR Cargo (F) 0.32 0.34 – – – –/– 5.9% Passengers Rail
NS Cargo (NL) 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.15 –/– 7.1% Passengers Rail
Glodex Transport, logistics, and aircargo Road
CCS (D) – – – – – – 450,000 TEU Barge
SRN (S) – 0.15 – – – – Logistics, terminals Barge
DSB (DK) 0.15 0.15 – – 0.0% Passengers Rail
Haniel Reederei (D) 0.21 0.21 – – – 0.0% Steel, pharmaceuticals Barge
RENFE (Sp) – 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.09 9.1% Terminals, logistics Rail
Danser Container Line BV 100,000 TEU Barge
Total  – –
* In this Table, rail, road, barge, and short sea are included and analysed as far as possible
Source: annual reports, 1998, 1999 16,17,18,19
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Suppliers of transport facilities
The suppliers of inputs for transport service provid-
ers are quite heterogeneous. They include producers of
transport means (e.g., barge), warehouse, office, rail track,
electricity, transshipment terminals, and ICT equipment sup-
pliers. Depending on the sales volume the transport com-
panies may represent considerable economic power with
respect to the suppliers. As most rail transport companies
are relatively large, their competitive power towards their
suppliers will be considerable. The scale of most barge
transport companies is small, and their competitive power
towards suppliers tends to be relatively weak. Maritime and
continental terminals supply transport companies with
transshipment services. Maritime terminals represent large
volumes to transport companies, and their competitive
power is therefore considerable. Continental terminals are
smaller than maritime terminals and depend more on trans-
port companies for transshipment volume.
Potential entrants into the transport market
Potential entrants to the European transport market
are existing companies from the USA and Japan that are
eager to increase their presence in Europe. This third
competitive force imposes a serious threat to current
transport companies. Entry barriers for potential entrants
to the transport market are not high. The potential entrants
will probably ensure better efficiency and an improved
utilisation of transport networks through a better combi-
nation of road, rail, short sea, and barge transport. Most
continental terminals operate their own barging services
to a selected number of destinations. Maritime terminals
may be expected to enter the transport market to increase
the efficiency of the total combined transport marketing
channel. Another threat may come from rail transport ser-
vice providers that decide to start operating their own rail
transport company. A third group of potential entrants
comes from global production companies that are inter-
ested to operate their own rail transport service (e.g.
chemicals).
Substitutes for transport
There are no substitutes for transport. Transport can
be varied in space or time, but transport is an activity that
has to be performed to reach the final consumer or to pro-
duce a product.
Transport regulations
External effects are increasingly charged to infra-
structure users. The barging service market is very com-
petitive and not directly regulated (barges transport freight
in rotation). This has ensured the emergence of good and
competitive services. The rail transport market is not very
competitive and still mostly oriented towards the domestic
market. This has led to low service quality and few services
provided. The road transport market is quite heavily regu-
lated. Maximum loads, licenses per country and many
other regulations apply to this transport sector. Environ-
mental pressure is also mounting and will likely result in
more regulation in the medium term. In the near future,
regulation may be expected to be in favour of the more
environmentally friendly perceived transport market seg-
ments of rail, barge, and short sea transport. Probably this
will further strengthen the competitive position of conti-
nental terminals.
3.3 Competitor analysis of transport service provid-
ers
In this section the goal was to compare industry
competitors on their historical sales volume. Due to a lack
of data we have selected the rail transport service pro-
viders and compared them on productivity numbers for
1998 (second best solution).
Both figures show the competitive position of rail
transport service providers in Europe. The first figure con-
sists of the total sales in 1998, the total transported tonnes,
and the total tonkm. These numbers are used for com-
posing the second figure, where two productivity num-
bers for 1998 are compared: sales per ton and sales per
tonkm. In both figures total sales are the leading number
for ranking the companies. Figure 8 shows that rail trans-
port companies originating from big national markets play
an important role in Europe. According to both figures it
is also possible to pick the leaders, nichers, followers, and
challengers according to the above mentioned productiv-
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Fig. 8 Sales volume in billion Euro, million ton, and
billion tonkm for the ten biggest rail transport
service providers
Source: Annual reports, 2000
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ity measures. Leaders in this respect are big companies
(in terms of sales volume) that are capable of realising
high productivity rates at the same time. The obvious
leader is EWS from England. Nichers are companies that
manage to realise high productivity rates but still have rela-
tively low market shares in terms of sales volume. Com-
panies aim for a few related businesses (focusing), realise
high growth rates and have relatively good profits.
Nichers are then DSB from Denmark and RENFE from
Spain. Followers have low productivity numbers and low
sales volumes compared with their competitors in the rail
transport market. Clear followers seem to be NS, VR Cargo,
and NMBS.
Finally, challengers are companies with a relatively
high market share (sales volume), but with a relatively
low productivity rate compared with its competitors.
Challengers are Deutsche Bahn, SNCF, Rail Cargo Aus-
tria, VR Cargo Group, FS Cargo, and SBB. The figures are
the result of the operations of companies and show only
a temporary overview of a small part of the transport mar-
ket, namely rail transport.
3.4 Conclusions on transport
Maritime container terminals and continental con-
tainer terminals do not have a great influence in the trans-
port service market. In general, maritime container terminals
are engaged in the transshipment of containers, but conti-
nental terminals offer pre- and end-haulage and barge
transshipment as well. Maritime container terminals are
increasingly serving the logistics market of containerised
freight. Maritime terminals are not serving barge trans-
port markets with barging services in their service port-
folio, but continental terminals are.
Usually, continental terminals operate their own
barge transport services to a selected number of destina-
tions, while also pre-and end-haulage is offered. Conti-
nental terminals are not offering rail transport as part of
their service portfolio. The only connection with rail they
have is the transshipment of containers to and from ar-
riving and departing trains. Most continental rail termi-
nals that exist form part of the ‘still existing’ national
railway monopolies. Continental terminals with their own
barging services compete with barge transport companies.
Most barge transport companies operate their own con-
tinental container terminals or are continental container
terminals that operate their own barge transport services.
Road transport is generally offered through pre- and end-
haulage of containers. Usually, shortsea transport is not
offered by continental container terminals. A short sea
service is introduced if the volume is high enough. Criti-
cal Success Factors for continental container terminals are
favourable pre- and end-haulage to and from the termi-
nal, good connections by barge and if possible by rail,
and sufficient local based container volume.
Maritime container terminals are concentrating on
their core business of transshipping containers. Most
maritime terminals are not offering transport services, but
they are increasingly offering logistics services to their
customers, mainly deep sea shipping and global produc-
ers. In this respect the maritime container terminals are
challenging the traditional logistics service providers for
control of the marketing channel. The maritime container
terminals do have the advantage to be the first part of the
continental marketing channel. Critical Success Factors
for maritime container terminals are good transshipment
services, engagement in information management, and
backing from deep sea shipping companies.
In conclusion, we see that continental terminals are
competing with unimodal road transport, with neighbouring
continental terminals and with barge transport companies.
The position of continental terminals vis-à-vis rail trans-
port and continental rail terminals is somewhat different.
Usually the rail terminals form part of the national rail
monopolies and are only there to facilitate the rail trans-
port. Besides transshipment, continental terminals are
serving the barge transport market and the market of pre-
and end-haulage. Maritime terminals are competing with
other maritime terminals for transshipment volume. With
logistics service providers they are competing for other
marketing channel flow elements. Overall, they are serv-
ing the transshipment market and increasingly also the
logistics market.
Fig. 9 Sales volume in billion Euro, sales per ton in
Euro, and sales/tonkm for the ten biggest rail
transport service providers
Source: Annual reports, 2000
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4. CONCLUSIONS
The central theme in this paper addressed the as-
sessment of the competitive position of intermodal con-
tainer terminals with respect to logistics and transport
markets. Three economic theories have been used in or-
der to structure this task. The central question of this paper
has been: Which markets are served by intermodal con-
tainer terminals and with whom are they competing?
The management of marketing channel flows (lo-
gistics) has traditionally been a task of logistics service
providers that concentrate on the management of freight.
We observe a growing number of maritime terminals that
are offering the management of marketing channel flows.
Besides the transshipment of containers they provide
logistics services to deep sea container carriers and on the
other hand they provide logistics services to global pro-
ducers. Until recently, maritime container terminals were
not offering transport services themselves. Maritime con-
tainer terminals are offering transshipment and market-
ing channel management services. They are competing
with other maritime container terminals and with tradi-
tional logistics service providers for control over the mar-
keting channel flows. Currently, continental container
terminals are not present in these markets. Critical Suc-
cess Factors (CSF) for maritime container terminals ac-
tive in these markets are then engagement in information
management and big logistics contracts with global pro-
ducers. Another CSF is market definition (transshipment/
transport/logistics) and corresponding business units. At
the moment both maritime container terminals and con-
tinental container terminals do not have a great influence
in the logistics service market. They concentrate on the
physical movement of containers (transshipment). Mari-
time container terminals, however, are increasingly serv-
ing the logistics market of containerised freight. In this
respect the maritime container terminals are challenging
the traditional logistics service providers for control of
the marketing channel. The maritime container terminals
do have the advantage to be the first part of the conti-
nental marketing channel. Critical Success Factors for
maritime container terminals are good transshipment ser-
vices, engagement in information management, and back-
ing from deep sea shipping companies.
Both maritime container terminals and continental
container terminals do not have great influence in the
transport service market. In general, maritime container
terminals are mainly active in the transshipment of con-
tainers, but continental terminals offer pre- and end-haul-
age and barge transshipment as well. Maritime terminals
are not serving barge transport markets with their own
barging services, but continental terminals do. Continental
terminals are thus serving the road and barge transport mar-
kets and also providing transshipment services. In this
respect they are competing with unimodal road transport
companies and with neighbouring container terminals. Usu-
ally, continental terminals operate their own barge trans-
port services to a selected number of destinations while also
pre-and end-haulage is offered. Continental terminals are
not offering rail transport as part of their service portfolio.
Most existing continental rail terminals form part of the
national railway monopolies.
Continental terminals with their own barging ser-
vices compete with barge transport companies. Most
barge transport companies operate their own continental
container terminals or are continental container terminals
that operate their own barge transport services. Critical
Success Factors for continental container terminals are:
favourable pre- and end-haulage to and from the termi-
nal, good connections by barge and if possible by rail,
and sufficient locally based container volume. Overall we
see that continental terminals are competing with
unimodal road transport, with neighbouring continental
terminals and with barge transport companies. Besides
transshipment, continental terminals are serving the barge
transport market and the market of pre- and end-haulage.
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